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Abstract 
Managing DoD acquisition programs is a complicated process. The turbulence created by 
funding instability makes it even more difficult. To help program offices maintain their overall 
funding execution pace, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) instituted Obligation 
and Expenditure rate goals over two decades ago. Acquisition program managers have found 
it difficult to meet established Obligation and Expenditure rate goals. For the purposes of this 
study (sponsored by Nancy Spruill, director of Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and based on 
Defense Acquisition University and OSD subject matter expertise, the authors looked closely 
at potential causal factors that could be interfering with the achievement of these goals. Two 
hundred and twenty-nine DoD personnel responded to a comprehensive survey. The 
respondents were comprised of program office personnel (program managers [PMs], deputy 
PMs, budget and financial managers [FMs], and contracting officers); program executive 
officers (PEOs) and their chief financial officers; and a variety of senior OSD staff including 
Headquarters FM senior staff and Senior Acquisition Executive staff. The respondents were 
asked if they found metrics helpful in better meeting OSD goals as well as the use of any 
process improvements. 
Introduction 
In the months preceding this research effort, Nancy Spruill, director, Acquisition 
Resources and Analysis, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD [AT&L]) solicited support from the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) to help uncover the causal factors that could be interfering with the 
attainment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD’s) Obligation and Expenditure 
rate goals. To learn more about the intervening obstacles, DAU, along with assistance from 
the OSD, developed a comprehensive survey that queried experienced and high-level 
Department of Defense (DoD) personnel involved in a weapon program’s decision chain. 
What we learned from the subsequent analysis confirmed several previous suspicions. The 
data also indicated the prevalence of more underlining perception variances among many of 
the factors that could be undermining program execution itself. 
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Research Methodology  
Two hundred and twenty-nine DoD personnel responded to this survey. The 
respondents were comprised of program office personnel (program managers, deputy 
program managers, budget and financial managers, and contracting officers), program 
executive officers and their chief financial officers (CFOs), and a variety of senior staff at the 
OSD including Headquarter Financial Management (FM) senior staff and Senior Acquisition 
Executive (SAE) staff (Table 1). Because several functional areas saw lower response rates, 
a more detailed analysis of the causal factors was restricted to an aggregate sample size 
given the confidence levels required to draw any inferences or conclusions.  
Table 1. Respondent Demographics 
 
Respondents ranked the impact of 64 factors under nine categories (Figure 1). The 
researchers then assessed the rankings using a top box (TB) three methodology (i.e., the 
percentage of 5, 6, and 7 responses on a Likert-like scale from 1–7). Since the frequency of 
occurrence for some factors could also be contributing to the interference, the researchers 









Figure 2 shows the distribution of all 64 factors assessed. Three factors reported an 
impact rating of two standard deviations above the mean (denoted by +2 ); six factors 
reported an impact rating of one standard deviation above the mean (denoted by +1 ); and 
22 factors rose above an average impact rating (denoted by x). The remaining 33 factors fell 
below the aggregate x. 
Nineteen of the 22 factors measured for frequency of occurrence resulted in an 
impact rating above 39%. Sometimes, just one occurrence appeared to have a significant 
impact. 
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The Causal Factors Rank Ordered 
Table 2 lists the relative ranking of all 64 factors in the context of top box descending 
order to provide a comprehensive view of all factors, although the remaining discussion in 
this paper addresses the factors above x. Unrealistic Spend Plans (F10), also one of the 
factors assessed, is generally valued as a written forecast of a program’s funding needs and 
establishes Obligation and Expenditure projections. However, spend plans are subjected to 
so many real world eventualities that updating them becomes problematic in sustaining its 
forecasting value. 
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Table 2. Impact Factor Ratings in Aggregate Descending Order 
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Factors and Respondent Groups 
Figure 3 accounts for the 31 factors above the mean and by respondent group seen 
in Table 1. The 31 factors were the only ones further evaluated in this study unless a factor 
shifted above x after any further delineation (e.g., ACAT levels, military components, 
position, etc.). Unexpectedly, the individual factors showed widespread perception 
disparities among the respondent groups for the factors that fell below +2 . After analyzing 
the specific individual factors among all the respondent groups, seven of the 31 factors had 
an unusually large . As a result of these conspicuous gaps, we turned to the qualitative 
data. We also watched for any strong correlations (e.g., correlation coefficients (r) > 0.7) to 
better understand the reasons for the differences, as well as the influence of any intervening 
and/or moderating factor couplings. The remaining discussion addresses the 31 impact 
factors in descending order from highest to lowest. 
 
 
The Factors That Ranked Above +   
In Figure 3, late release of full obligation/budget authority due to Continuing 
Resolution Authority (F1), Contract Negotiations Delays (F2), and Contract Award Delays 
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(F3) all rose above 2 , where 67% or more of the respondents claimed they had the highest 
adverse impact of all factors measured. The occurrence of CRA had the most significant 
negative impact to Obligation and Expenditure rates. It also had one of the smallest 
variances ( ) among the respondent groups. Even with the expectation that CRA might 
prevail and the subsequent planning that followed for such a likely event, many PMs pointed 
to an overly conservative and slow internal vetting process posture that created additional 
obstacles in meeting OSD goals. Several PMs recommended the use of some sort of “CRA 
variable” to temporarily offset the consequences of CRA if the required funds were not 
released as originally projected. Next in rank order were contract negotiations and contract 
award delays. The respondents emphasized that the DoD could fix the problem more readily 
since unlike CRA, these factors were under internal control. When asked what could be 
done to reduce the adverse effects of all three factors, the respondents recommended the 
“inclusion of more risk mitigation into contract award planning, more realistic timelines, more 
realistic plans, greater funding stability, reduction in bureaucratic obstacles, more 
synchronized internal processes, and better aligned accounting systems.”  
The Factors That Ranked Above +   
This next line of demarcation (Figure 3, factors F4–F9) included many contracting-
related factors (i.e., Shortage of Contracting Officers [F4], Contractor Proposal Prep Delays 
[F6], RFP Prep Delays [F8], and Source Selection [F9]). Nearly all the factors showed the 
emergence of a more alarming  between the individual respondent groups—as high as 
18% in one case (i.e., Proposal Prep Delays [F6]). For this particular factor, PCOs reported 
the highest impact while PMs ranked it as the lowest. Senior staff cited that Shortage of 
Contracting Officers (F4) created the highest impact, while PCOs reported it had the lowest 
impact. With a 7% , it was the lowest among all six factors in this grouping.  
Given that six of the top nine factors were contract-specific factors that ranked above 
+1  (see Figure 3), it came as little surprise to see so many reinforcing comments surface: 
 “Lack of experienced and qualified contract specialists” 
 “Alarmingly low personnel qualified … many unsure/lack guidance and 
experience” 
 Significantly stressed with overtime to complete all contracting actions prior to 
close of fiscal year” 
 “Inadequate training … inordinate number of interns with very low experience 
in all career fields” 
 “Lack of sufficient legal personnel trained in acquisition” 
 “Loss in brain trust and skill to develop complete, clear SOWs using proactive 
contract language” 
 “SOW writing and the teaching of SOW-writing classes is greatly left to 
contractors or support contractors resulting in unclear language” 
The highest frequency of occurrence was also associated with contracting-related 
factors (Figure 3). By far, the aggregate respondents rated Shortage of Contracting Officers 
(F4) as the single highest factor among all 22 factors measured for frequency. Because the 
contracting activity timeline generally has lengthy durations, any disruption appears to have 
an unmistakable impact on contract award. Shortage of Contracting Officers (F4) was seen 
as having the most significant impact. Several respondents said that “multiple contracting 
actions were having compounding consequences.”  
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The two remaining factors above +1 , Congressional Marks (F5) and OSD Directed 
RMD Adjustment (F7), had very low frequency of occurrences but still reported a very high 
impact, similar to CRA. When combining these with F4, all three appear to be a strong 
antecedent force (or moderating factor) to the already time-consuming chain of contracting 
actions. 
The Factors That Ranked Above   
This final grouping (Figure 3, factors F10–F31) accounted for the remaining 22 impact 
factors. Perception polarities persisted especially between two respondent groups—senior 
staff outside the program office and PMs inside program offices. For PMs in every case 
except one (i.e., Component Directed POM Adjustment [F17]), the impact factors ranked well 
below x. In sharp contrast, senior staff in every case except one (i.e., Component Directed 
POM Adjustment [F17]) stated the majority of top 31 factors had the largest impact or close 
to it among all respondent groups. 
Even though the remaining impact factors above x	 are still significant, the 
researchers shifted the focus to the presence of any strong correlations since factor 
couplings could be having a moderating effect and require a closer look.  
The Factors That Correlate  
Table 3 summarizes the strongest and weakest factor correlations for all 
respondents queried. Several strong correlations surfaced for factors above x. User 
Requirements (F11) and User Priorities (F19) were very strongly correlated. In three specific 
instances, two factors above x	 were very strongly correlated with three factors that fell 
below x: Key Acquisition Experience (F27) and Inadequate Training (F48); Key Acquisition 
Experience (F27) and Tenure of PM and other Key Positions (F46); and DCMA Administration 
Actions (F36) and DCAA Administration Actions (F22). Three contract-related factors (F4, F8, 
and F9) showed weaker correlations than unexpected. Because a factor had a weak 
correlation does not mean it had any less importance, but any course of action intended to 
mitigate the presence of any impact factor strongly correlated with another should be 
weighed more heavily in any recommended action. For example, the turnover of PMs could 
be part of the experience quotient. 
Table 3. Factor Correlation Couplings 
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Factor Plotting 
The researchers generated a scatter plot diagram (Figure 4) that punctuated how the 
31 factors fluctuated between impact and frequency of occurrence. In some cases, the 
impact of certain factors occurred with low frequencies of occurrence. In other cases, the 
frequency of occurrence compounded the impacts.  
The research data was rebased to a Likert-like scale for plotting the frequency and 
adverse impact response averages. The researchers included Factors F29–F31 in Figure 4 
because they only fall slightly below x. 
 
 
For the relationships that were co-linear (e.g., the most strongly correlated depicted 
in Table 3), the researchers explored whether they also behaved as strong predictors across 
the sample population. After investigating -ratios (used with ACAT level factors) and beta-
weights (used for the sample population), we determined that the relationships were not 
significantly co-linear enough to substantiate causation. Consequently, there was no merit in 
running any further regression that analyzed the factors as predictors. However, the 
researchers conducted another set of tests by modulating certain respondent demographics 
and holding x constant.  
Factor Plotting—Modulating ACAT Levels 
Figure 5 shows how the factor rankings changed after isolating ACAT levels.  
ACAT I 
Funding and requirements factors (F18, F19, F23, and F26) previously ranked above x 
dropped below x, while Contractor Proposal Delays (F6) rose markedly to become the 
highest impact factor. Component Directed POM Adjustment (F17) made a noticeable shift to 
the top nine factors (or one standard deviation above the mean). 
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ACAT II 
Fifteen of the factors previously ranked above x dropped below x (leaving only F1, F2, 
F3, and F17). Four of the factors that fell below x included contracting-related factors (F4, F6, 
F8, and F9).  
ACAT III 
Six of the factors (F16, F18, F19, F21, F23, and F24) previously ranked above x dropped 
below x. Shortages of Personnel (F29, F30, F39, and F51) and Redirection of Contractor Efforts 
(F37) became more dominating issues for the respondents. Changes in User Priorities (F19), 
Changes in Stakeholder Requirements (F13), and Funding Loss from Reprograming Actions 
due to Higher Priority Requirements (F26) all moved significantly above x. 
This more detailed differentiation, as found in the scatter plots, gives additional 
insight into ACAT-specific areas through a more granular view of the factors that would 
benefit from a more focused investigation. In some cases, reducing frequency of occurrence 
or perhaps instituting more early warning metrics could have a marked effect in reducing 
any adverse impacts.  
 
 
Factor Plotting—Modulating Respondent Groups 
Figure 6 shows how the factor rankings changed after isolating the Respondent 
Groups. 
Program Office 
Six factors dropped below x: Awaiting Reprogramming Action (F18), Changes in User 
Priorities (F19), Program Delays from Prerequisite Events (F21), Unplanned Congressional 
adds to PB Request (F23), Use of Undefinitized Contract Action Delays (F24), and Loss of 
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Funding through Reprogramming Action to higher priority Requirements to PEO Portfolio 
(F26). No factors fell below x.  
PEO 
Use of Undefinitized Contract Action Delays (F24) fell below x while four factors rose 
above x: Shortage of Cost Estimators (F29), Shortage of Business and Finance Management 
Personnel (F30), Component Comptroller withhold (F35), and Insufficiently Planned OCO 
Funding (F50). 
Senior OSD Staff 
Awaiting Reprogramming Action (F18) fell below x while 13 factors rose above x. 
For PEO and senior OSD staff, personnel shortages (F29, F30, F20, F40) became more 
dominant, while awaiting reprogramming action (F18) became less dominant for program 
office and senior OSD staff personnel. Of the three grouping in this particular case, nowhere 
were there more factor increases than for senior OSD staff personnel. The rise in factors 
F34, F43, and F59 seemed intuitive since senior staff may see first-hand the longer time it 
takes for programs to react to changes in their plans. However, it was very interesting to see 
what senior OSD staff personnel felt represented the major impediments to meeting the 
OSD’s Obligation and Expenditures rate goals that program office personnel did not, 
especially shortage of personnel and contract-specific factors like F45 and F37. This wide 
perception disparity deserves a more intensive understanding since it could be creating 
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Respondent Comments Regarding the Factors 
The respondents were also asked several open-ended questions about the use of 
metrics they found that helped them better meet OSD goals, as well as any process 
improvements they would recommend. They stated that the metrics that made a difference 
for them included “real-time monitoring, frequent reviews, tight coupling to contractor actions 
and milestones, and realistic spend plans with inch stones.” As for necessary improvements 
to current processes, the respondents recommended the inclusion of a CRA duration 
variable that readjusted expectations, establish more realistic program goals, ensure more 
funding stability, reduce bureaucratic obstacles and streamline more outdated processes, 
forge greater cooperation between government and industry, and synchronize disparate 
accounting systems used in obligation/expenditure reporting. 
The respondents provided a number of qualitative comments that reinforced the 
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Comparison With a Similar Study 
After this study was completed, the OUSD(AT&L), ODCAPE, and OSD(C) sponsored 
a related effort with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) entitled Implications of DoD 
Funds Execution Policy for Acquisition Program Management (Conley et al., 2014). IDA was 
asked to increase the current understanding of the extent and causes of under-execution 
and suggest changes to improve outcomes. They took a two-fold approach: (1) Examine 
trends in the ability of the DoD to execute appropriated funds, and (2) conduct an in-depth 
investigation into the causes of funds under-execution for selected programs and the effects 
on those programs of associated financial management practices. After drawing insights 
from an in-depth investigation of 25 individual programs during face-to-face interviews, they 
categorized their causal factors along five areas: 
 Contracting issues (i.e., personnel shortages and inexperience, award 
protests, peer reviews of contracting process documentation, and negotiation 
delays) 
 Congressional actions (i.e., additions and reductions to requested funding, 
continuing Resolutions [CRs], and sequestration) 
 Management actions and program events (i.e., changes to requirements, 
contract type, schedule, responses to operational needs, technical and 
testing problems, and slow contractor billing) 
 Policy choices (i.e., use of execution benchmarks and withholding funding by 
services under CRs) 
 Program office personnel shortages and experience levels 
Figure 8 shows how the study results are very similar, although IDA did not measure 
“frequency.” 
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Recommendations 
What next? Based on the research findings of this study, there are a number of 
impact factors above x ̅ that if sufficiently addressed could help lower the barriers to the 
attainment of the OSD’s Obligation and Expenditure rate goals. Hence, we offer the 
following recommendations: 
 Institute an Obligation and Expenditure baseline adjustment for programs 
affected by any funding delay or limitation (especially CRA), then measure a 
program’s progress to that revised adjustment. 
 More thoroughly review the entire contracting action value chain. Look closely 
at efficiency opportunities along the review and decision cycle continuum, 
especially from the time an RFP is developed to the time a contract is let. Set 
reasonable time thresholds with triggers that afford more proactive measures 
by PMs and confirm productivity.  
 Establish a recurring communication forum among key stakeholders, 
especially PMs and the OSD, to dialogue more frequently and eliminate 
perception gaps that could be creating counterproductive actions and 
misconceptions. 
 Track requirement changes throughout a program’s life and look more 
strategically at the effects on program execution and accompanying 
Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs). Despite ACAT levels, there is an 
obvious ripple effect that is associated with any substantive change in 
program content across a program’s life that should be codified more 
comprehensively. However, there are also issues associated with different 
ACAT levels which must be noted. 
 Review the program review cycle and streamline wherever possible. Checks 
and balances within the DoD’s acquisition community are a vital constituent 
component of program execution, but every review should have a distinctive 
purpose, exit criteria, and associated suspense date that is just as material 
and credible. 
 Build and maintain realistic spend plans, measure against them, account for 
contingencies, and make adjustments with required frequency due to real 
world realities. Collaborate with senior leadership early enough about 
required adjustments to avoid more draconian measures later. 
 Validate the key personnel shortage areas and recognize the time it takes to 
rebuild those experience levels.  
 Nurture experience in key functional areas with strong catalysts such as 
disciplined on-the-job training (OJT) programs, mentoring, and guidance. 
With the recent surge of contracting specialist interns, their progress as a 
group should be measured more carefully. 
 Evaluate the real effects of reprogramming action or realignment of future 
budget decisions before any corrective action is taken. 
 Conduct a wholesale review of the program execution metrics currently in 
place and determine their usefulness and effectiveness. What are they 
actually measuring? Consolidate whenever practical and eliminate the ones 
that have outlived their usefulness. 
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 Encourage innovation and avoid the “bookkeeping process,” as RAND 
Corporation (2009) found in a recent study could be limiting improvements 
championed by PMs. 
Summary 
This research exposed a number of challenges that could easily be mitigated by 
more frequent communication and especially a better appreciation of stakeholder 
management. There are so many stakeholders involved in the acquisition process. No 
stakeholder should be dismissed without a more intensive assessment of their (potential) 
contribution. Sometimes, either their voice is not heard or their concern not appropriately 
considered. Next, having a program management strategy that can help leaders react to 
funding reductions is also critical. A wide variety of financial tools exist that track and predict 
funds execution, but Spend Plans that serve as the common device to convey program 
execution have to be current and agile enough to demonstrate reality and common sense 
for whatever curve balls come their way. Finally, as baby boomers start to retire at a more 
aggressive rate, experience will matter even more. An OJT program that nurtures 
experience and leadership development as well as demands critical thinking is just what the 
acquisition community should expect. 
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